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Security, Dividedness and Green Activism in Egypt 
 




 This paper attempts to trace green trends in contemporary political activism in Egypt. 
Taking into consideration the long, deep-rooted history of military rule in the country, it examines 
the interconnection between the concepts of security and resistance. The paper specifically focuses 
on post-2011 grassroots, civil and opposition movements in Egypt, arguing that they share and 
adopt green concerns with nonviolent, comprehensive activism that relate and politicize different 
forms of environmental, gender, socio-economic, and political violence. In this sense, to fight 
patriarchy and the militarization and securitization of public spaces and daily activities in Egypt, 
post-revolutionary activists, feminists, and opposition movements adopt a hybrid green 
perspective relating to human-environmental equality and wellbeing. They approach the violent 
practices of successive 21st-century regimes in Egypt, particularly in the post-2011 era, and 
security apparatuses as one systematic strategy of patriarchy and corruption. Such awareness of 
the unequal distribution of insecurity and political inclusion offers a deep-level perspective of 
inequality among Egyptians, their rights, and their environments.  
 




Introduction: Green Activism, Patriarchy, and Security Violence  
 
“Green politics is an ecological, holistic, and feminist movement that transcends 
the old political framework of left versus right. […] It addresses the unjust and 
destructive dynamics of patriarchy. Green politics rejects all forms of exploitation 
– of nature, individuals, social groups, and countries. It is committed to 
nonviolence at all levels” (Capra and Spretnak, 21). 
 
In the above quotation, Fritiof Capra and Charlene Spretnak perceive green politics as a secular, 
hybrid, plural, and comprehensive form of activism. It is a process of individual and social 
awareness and nonviolent action against all forms of polarization, patriarchy, and injustice. Green 
politics is not only an admission of the diversity and equality of human beings and natural 
environments but also an objection to any form of abuse or violation of the right to equality of 
humans of different genders, cultures, religions, and ethnicities on the one side and humans and 
nature on the other. Although green politics targets mainly individual attitudes, Capra and Spretnak 
argue that “it calls for social responsibility and a sound, sustainable economic system, one that is 
ecological decentralized, equitable and comprised of flexible institutions” (21). Noel Sturgeon 
supports Capra and Spretnak that green politics seeks to establish a “post-patriarchal society” 
through “the stress on decentralization, participatory democracy, and sustainable economic and 
 
1 Jihan Zakarriya is an Assistant Professor at AIAS, Aarhus University. 
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ecological practices” (33). Seen this way, green politics share broad, global concerns with a whole 
array of disciplines and issues facing many modern societies including environmental degradation, 
injustice, militarization, inequality, and hierarchies. As climate change and environmental 
problems escalate worldwide, green politics grow stronger. Nowadays, green parties in Canada, 
Scotland, Germany, and other countries are running for parliamentary elections in these countries 
and gain increasing support (Derek, 12). Thus, green politics support feminist, political, and 
environmental causes calling for gender-religion-class and ethnic unbiases and justices. In addition 
to this, with the Coronavirus pandemic in the background, green politics not only aims at wider 
political manifestations concerning environmental hygiene and sustainability, but also arouses 
serious inquiries concerning justice, equality, and humanitarian-ethical attitudes among genders, 
ethnicities, and poor and rich classes, and countries.   
Green concerns with the interdependence between human and environmental abuse on the 
one side and resistance against organized unequal distribution of natural resources, authoritarian 
rule, securitized spaces and censored access to public spaces is relevant to 21st-century Egypt. On 
25 January 2011, the annual Police Holiday in Egypt, protesters spread all over public areas in 
Cairo and all Egyptian cities and governorates calling for “social justice, freedom and an end of 
police brutality and the emergency law” (Birnbaum, 1). Egyptian 2011 revolution aims at a 
decentralized economy, democratic transition, and healthy human and environmental conditions. 
From 2011 to the present, grassroots movements such as 6 April, Enough, Tamarod, and the 
National Association for Change, human rights movements such as the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights, and El Nadeem Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and Torture, and feminist movements such as anti-Sexual Harassment, I Saw 
Harassment, Tahrir Bodyguard, #MeToo and #assaultpolice succeed in mobilizing for legal and 
public action against patriarchal and authoritarian practices of Hosni Mubarak (1980-2011), 
SCAF: the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (2011-2012), Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013) and 
Abdel-Fatah el-Sisi (2014- ). The unifying, customary enemy that faces Egyptian activists under 
such different regimes is a very influential, legalized, organized security state. In 1981, President 
Mubarak introduces the Emergency Law, still in effect till the present, that legalizes and 
normalizes the militarization and securitization of private and public spaces in Egypt. The police, 
the military, and the General National Intelligence utilize the Emergency Law to use exceptional 
measures to oppress, arrest and torture opposition political parties, individuals, and normal people. 
Gradually, mass arrests, incommunicado, sexual violations, and prolonged detentions without trial 
and torture are common in Egyptian police stations and prisons (Reza, 535). In this sense, Egyptian 
activists fight what Michael Foucault calls “bio-politics.” In Security, Territory, 
Population, Foucault argues that “basic biological features of the human species become the object 
of a political strategy and security” (16). For Foucault, all modern political regimes seek to 
discipline and control the physical and cultural qualities and attitudes of their communities and 
individuals. So, the concept of security develops from the regulation of and sovereignty over 
territorial boundaries to the regulation and control of population and natural resources. Thus, 
representatives of authority not only employ “the individual as a particular way of dividing up the 
multiplicity,” but also “milieu becomes the determining factor of nature” (17). In revolutionary 
Egypt, Paul Amar describes bio-politics in the following way: 
 
The SCAF preserved the essence of Mubarak’s Emergency Decree, reinvigorated 
the military court system to arrest and try civilians, and extended the repressive 
power of its class-and sexuality-driven logic of domination. Many of those detained 
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were young, male, working-class labor protesters whom the armed forces identified 
not as political dissenters with rights but as thugs (baltagiya) or fags (khawaliya). 
… They detained women protesters and administered “virginity tests,” hymen 
inspections that are of course forms of molestation or rape in themselves. (3) 
As explained by Amar, bio-political patriarchy and violence in Egypt are methodical and 
anti-green. Security apparatuses and the military coercively dominate and control public spaces 
and human bodies. Police violence in the post-2011 era includes security chaos, dangerous public 
spaces, coercive disappearance of protesters and activists, murder, organized sexual attacks, 
violent arrests, and torture in prisons (Kingsley 2014; Grove 2015 and Tadros 2015). Such violent 
practices circulate sexist, classist, and divisive. To begin with, female protesters are seen as 
“whores whose public presence was an attack on national honor,” while working-class protesters 
“defiled national dignity and insulted the army” (Amar, 3). To further punish protesters, security 
agents make protest spaces and surrounding environments unhealthy, unsafe, and hostile. They 
destroy the green space in Tahir Square and the neighborhood and build an elaborate system of 
walls and barbed-wire roadblocks to ward off demonstrators. Security agents assault medical 
personnel and prevent medical supplies from accessing protest spaces. (Malsin, 1). Gradually, 
public opposition, activists, and human rights figures are defamed in the media. For instance, 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is accused 
of “facilitating American invasion of Iraq” and as “being westernized” (Amnesty International 
2016). Members of the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Hisham Mubarak Law 
Center (HMLC), and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) are persistently accused of 
receiving “funds from foreign countries and as disturbing stability in Egypt” (Amnesty 
International 2016). Finally, the military utilizes the divisions and the disagreements among 
revolutionary groups and the failure of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi to unify all 
Egyptians or to gain their trust. Again, Egypt’s home security is propagated as disciplining and 
regulating chaotic protesters, and violent Islamists. Furthermore, the ability of the military and the 
deep state to grip on power in revolutionary Egypt reflects the complexity and interdependence of 
domestic, regional, and globalized security interests and deals. For instance, the military warns 
Egyptians of the disturbing, unusual security conditions in the area ranging from civil wars in 
Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the emergence of ISIS, and ethnic, sectarian conflicts in Iraq and 
Lebanon. The growth of populist regimes in the West and the support of authoritarian Gulf 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates empower the Egyptian military as 
well. Paul Carnegie explains that: 
 
The Egyptian military is still Washington’s favored institution for holding onto 
Egypt and maintaining a regional status quo conducive to its interests and that of 
local and global capital. There has been little change in the form of government. 
The el-Sisi ‘military junta’ represents little more than the continuation of 
Mubarak’s so-called civilian administration. (45) 
 
Carnegie underscores the fact that globalized economic and security management limits 
the Egyptian protesters’ ability to reform the security sector. As Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seizes power, 
he leads extensive, unprecedented crackdown on the opposition, grassroots, and civil movements, 
including those who support el-Sisi’s coup against Morsi. For instance, 2011 youth such as Ahmed 
Maher, Mohammed Adel, Ahmed Douma, Israa Abdel Fattah, Mona Seif, Asmaa Mahfouz, Shady 
Harb, and others (Egypt: largest wave 2019, 1). Revolutionary, independent, and free thinkers and 
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activists such as Amer Hamzawi, Alaa el-Aswani, Khalid Yusuf, Choukri Fishere, and others are 
forced to leave Egypt. The European Parliament’s report on human rights in Egypt (2015) states 
that “more than 22,000 people have been detained since 2013” (2). In 2013, Protest Law 107 
restricts giving the Interior Minister the right to “cancel, postpone or move the protest. Violators 
of the law face hefty prison sentences and fines” (Jeannerod, 1 and Darwish, 1). Sexual violence 
against women in public spaces continues so that in 2014-2015, 1964 cases of public sexual 
harassment and assault were reported. In 2014, a new parliamentary law was passed and in 2018 
referendum was passed to extend the President’s term and his power in the selection and control 
of the judiciary, as well as the reorganization of the legislative branch (Roll and Miehe, 1). In 2017, 
Law 70 is issued to control non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 2016, el-Sisi issues a law 
that enables him to dismiss Hisham Geneina, the head of the Egyptian Central Auditing 
Organization. Geneina states that he had “discovered corruption above 600 billion Egyptian 
pounds (about $ 70 billion) in 2015 alone” (Reuters 2016). El-Sisi’s dismissal of Geneina is met 
with disapproval from the judicial sector and wider sectors of civil society, but security oppression 
silences all.  
Seen this way, bio-political violence in contemporary Egypt upholds a narrative of chaotic, 
divisive, and unsafe public spaces, a narrative that contrasted with the first experience of 2011 
Tahrir Square and protests spaces as optimistic, inclusive, and secure. The extreme use of the 
Emergency Law and police power in revolutionary Egypt and the high levels of corruption in 
private and governmental sectors further frustrate and frighten many Egyptians from public revolt. 
In the forthcoming analysis, I aim at achieving two goals. Firstly, I examine how bio-politics in 
Egypt affects civil spaces and relationships among different classes and genders. I specifically 
focus on urban dividedness and spatial insecurity. Secondly, I trace how post-2011 activism 
exemplifies and is informed by different characteristics of green politics. It focuses specifically on 
access to public spaces, class-gender-religious integrity, and nonviolent interference in the 
decision-making processes in Egypt.  
 
Eco-human Inequalities and Divisions in 21st-century Egypt: Systematic Socio-economic 
Violence  
The constant securitization and militarization of Egyptian politics produce massive 
inequalities and abuses concerning the distribution of wealth, resources, services, and sustained 
ecosystems in the country. Jessica Winegar tackles aspects of poverty and spatial segregation in 
Egypt from an urban security perspective arguing that:  
 
As the 1990s and 2000s wore on, Cairenes griped not only about the trash but also 
about the filth and disrepair of public spaces such as squares, parks, bus stops, 
government offices, and schools. As state welfare policy shifted its focus from the 
poor to the rich, urban space became extremely segregated and militarized. Many 
with the means moved out of what they viewed as the “chaos” of mixed- or lower-
class areas of Cairo into gated communities or other secluded areas with private 
security systems. (Winegar 32) 
 
The urbanization and modernization processes in Egypt are class-oriented. While affluent and rich 
classes and areas enjoy full state protection, healthy environments, and administrative care, poor 
classes lack basic services and are perceived as dangerous and criminal. Moreover, affordable 
public spaces of socialization such as parks and open, green spaces are neglected and militarized 
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(Abul-Magd, 30). Urban and public spaces in Cairo are intentionally designed and administered to 
control and limit human bodies, particularly women’s bodies, through marginalization, violence, 
and insecurity that all entail fear of public spaces. There are no walking spaces in Egyptian streets 
and walking spaces are either destroyed or unmaintained. In Environmental Problems in Third 
World Cities, Jorge Hardoy, Diana Mitlin, and David Satterthwaite underscore the fact that urban 
development in Egypt has serious socio-economic and environmental drawbacks since: 
 
“more than 10 percent of the nation’s most productive farmland has been lost to 
urban encroachment in the last three decades, much of it through illegal squatting 
or sub-division while the same time prime sites within cities remain 
underdeveloped” (5).  
 
As “the poor are confined in the worst located and most dangerous areas and slums,” Hardoy, 
Mitlin, and Satterthwaite continue, “the most serious environmental problems are largely confined 
to poorer groups” (5). Likewise, M. Davis traces that “the 39.9% (11.8 million) of the urban 
population in Egypt [who] live in slums suffer from problems in the accessibility, high residential 
densities, deteriorated infrastructure, lack of services and the absence of open spaces” (3). Slums 
are often not recognized and addressed by the public authorities as an integral part of the city (UN-
Habitat 6). Moreover, the lack of basic services in slums results in the decline of the built and 
natural environments (Ali and Suleiman, 2006). In 2010, Egypt experiences an environmentally 
and health-threatening rubbish crisis as piles of rubbish spread all over Egyptian streets and the 
government fails to address the problem properly (Fahmi and Sutton 1766). Because of pervasive 
pollution, poor Egyptians suffer from long-term illnesses like kidney failure, cancer, or the 
Hepatitis C Virus (20%-10% of the population) and high and increasing rates of renal diseases and 
renal failure: roughly 30% of which are caused by Schistosomiasis, lack of safe drinking water 
and insufficient sewage treatment infrastructure (Wolfe and Abu-Raddad, 14757; Mahmoud et al, 
2013).  
The harmful influence of slums and impoverished areas, poor housing, and environmental 
conditions on the psychological and behavioral features of their inhabitants, particularly 
concerning women, arouses a variety of studies and inquiries. In Slums, Violence and Health, 
Silvia de Weerdt argues persuasively that “since poverty, overcrowding, lack hygiene, and basic 
human services, ill-health and governmental negligence are main characteristics of slums 
worldwide, aspects of inter-personal violence and insecurity increase” (2). Women are the prime 
victims of insecurity and sexual violence. In Dealing with Slums in Egypt, Sylvia Habib echoes 
Weerdt that residents of slums and poor areas in Egypt,  
 
“feel insecure as a result of the isolation from other neighborhoods of the area along 
with the absence of a police station and the negligence of the authorities to the 
region which resulted in the prevalence of bullying and violence in the area. [...] 
There are a lot of drug dealers and gangs in some of these areas” (73).  
 
Habib underscores further that slum residents suffer “negative impression the people outside the 
area got about them [due to] high levels of drugs and crimes in their areas” (73). Thus, slums and 
poor areas not only suffer systematic governmental negligence and abuse but also become a source 
of danger and insecurity to surrounding areas, specifically to women and to their peaceful 
inhabitants. They feel abandoned and inferiorized. Slums and poor and neglected areas in Egypt 
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have been the target of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups who dominate the civil society 
and shape culture. Islamists not only offer social services to many poor and marginalized 
communities but also propose themselves as a reliable substitute to the corrupt, unfair government. 
Nevertheless, Islamist President Morsi does not exert any real effort to improve living and 
environmental conditions in slums and poor areas. Likewise, in 2020, the Egyptian government 
takes sudden decisions that disturb slum dwellers and poor areas by ordering “the demolition of 
houses constructed illegally inside cities or on farmland with tens of thousands of people are losing 
their homes, especially with state authorities failing to offer them alternatives” (Egypt: Thousands 
at risk, 1). The government justifies its decisions that “between 2000 and 2017, around 2 million 
construction violations were committed in different parts of Egypt, and that Egypt has also lost 
over 12 percent of its nine million acres of farmland to the same violations” (Amin, 1). Egyptian 
government and authorities do not tell about or punish those who cause such high levels of 
corruption. Again, poor classes, rural people, and the ecosystem suffer.  
In addition to this, securitized, authoritarian regimes in Egypt not only neglect the 
deteriorating, unhealthy, and unsafe life in slums and poor areas in Egypt but also Historic Cairo 
and major tourist attractions lack necessary maintenance and care and are unspeakably damaged 
and exploited by looters and corrupt security agents who vandalize the Egyptian Museum and 
other tourist sites they are supposed to protect and guard (Parcak et al. 2016; Fradley el al. 
2017). Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index 2015 announces that “Egypt, the 83rd in the 
global ranking and 10th in the region, has experienced safety and security concerns and 
infrastructure limitations” (18). In this way, the prioritization of security measures and the 
relegation of human and ecological wellbeing to secondary positions, all related to securitized and 
militarized political-economic structures in Egypt, that negatively affect Egyptian integrity, 
administrative effectiveness, and (international) accountability, particularly about women’s rights 
and environmental sustainability. The dominant urban planning of segregated and secluded areas 
and communities in Egypt not only reflect the exclusive, class-oriented production and circulation 
of power in the country but also discriminatorily organize the relationship between the different 
classes, environments, and individuals and determine the habits, health hazards, norms, 
expectations, ecosystems, and images in mass media. The authoritarian rule and the security state 
in Egypt are anti-green politics and thinking. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the 
emergence of green trends and concerns within post-2011 activism in Egypt.  
 
Green Activism in Post-2011 Egypt 
In relation to the above-mentioned analysis of human and environmental neglect and the 
violence of the security state in Egypt, this part of the paper identifies three aspects of post-2011 
activism in Egypt as green. Firstly, in their fight against the persistently brutal and privileged 
security state, post-2011 activists in Egypt show great solidarity and ability for effective, collective 
mobilization and environmentally aware practices in public spaces. During all protests, rallies, and 
in sleeping tents and places built in Tahrir Square and other protest spaces, Egyptian protesters of 
all socioeconomic, religious, political, and gender backgrounds securely gather exemplifying what 
Douglas Torgerson calls “green citizen” who is “a political actor, who indeed acts with functional 
and constitutive ends in view, but who also engages in political performance” (23). Green citizens, 
Torgerson continues, balance between “the personal responsibility of the individual” and “the 
systematic patterns of incentives, structured principally through the administrative sphere that 
serve to shape and direct the behavior of the possessive individual” (23). During the 2011 
revolution, Egyptians’ solidarity in protest spaces reflects the intersections of hybrid and plural 
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aspects of shared vulnerability to patriarchy including police violence, socio-economic 
inequalities, health, and environmental problems, and lack of freedom of speech, all administered 
by the military rule and police state. Although Egyptian protesters seek different incentives of 
freedom, justice, respectable economic income, and health care, they develop a collective green 
awareness of their responsibility towards their spaces and nature. Jessica Winegar comments on 
Egyptians’ practices in public spaces as follows:   
 
The revolution enabled [Egyptians] to break the fear of the security forces. Perhaps 
for the first time in their lives, they could work, laugh, and play together in public 
space without an overwhelming sense of state surveillance or upper-class disgust. 
They were trying to reverse and reject, the neglect of the Mubarak government by 
taking the repair and beautification of the city into their own hands. (33-34) 
            
Winegar refers specifically to Egyptian people’s strong physical existence in public spaces as a 
direct challenge to state power. They are not afraid and do not care about police violence, torture, 
or even murder. Moreover, environmentally-friendly campaigns such as Tahrir Beautification Day 
and Let’s Clean that clean the Tahrir square and surrounding areas are a declaration of people’s 
ability for sound administration and for making decisions on behalf of their corrupt government. 
Ali Abdel Mohsen explains how environmental activism in 21st-century Egypt has played an 
important role in effecting sustained progress and environmental justice tackling the pressing 
issues of climate change, pollution, and mountains of trash in streets, overflowing sewers, and lack 
of services in poor areas (1). Mohsen mentions pre-2011 environmental initiatives for recycling 
and clean life that spread in different Cairene neighborhoods and online platforms, and how such 
campaigns raise awareness of serious health and ecological hazards in Egypt (1). Elliott Woods 
supports Mohsen that environmental activism plays important role in advocating equal ecological 
and human rights in Egypt. Woods regards Egyptians “picking up trash, painting curbs, and 
adorning light posts and tree trunks with the colors of the Egyptian flag [as] they were finally 
taking ownership of their capital and their country […] They were washing away corruption” 
(110). In this sense, decorating dirty, old walls with graffiti and cleaning streets are also acts of 
fighting negative feelings of uncertainty and temporality. Egyptians have experienced very long 
years of repression and silencing that talking publically about politics becomes taboo. So, Egyptian 
protesters’ spatial freedom and domination are a battle against time. They want to claim a 
permanent position of power. Protesters form self-sufficient communities in public spaces with 
specialized groups for medical help, food supplies, blankets and beds, and clean clothes and toilets 
(Biggs, 1). Practices of mutual care and sanitation, necessary to sustain bodies and surrounding 
environments in Tahrir square and protest spaces and to continue the struggle, are definitely acts 
of green awareness. Protesters show care towards their national and cultural heritage as well. They 
form a human chain to protect the priceless artifacts within the Egyptian National Museum 
(Halime, 2012, 1).  
Moreover, civil, human rights, and grassroots movements compete with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamists in offering help and services for slums and poor and marginalized areas 
in Egypt. They also offer new cultural and social services and ideas concerning gender equality, 
political responsibility, and environmental-health awareness. Consequently, residents of slums, 
rural and poor areas are encouraged to effectively participate in political change. In 2011, famous 
Egyptian actor and director Mohamed Sobhi initiates “Together for Developing Slums” as a non-
profit organization that aims to raise funds to “elevate slum-dwellers” standard of living, and grant 
181 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No. 9 September 2021 
them an integrated decent life, where they have an access to individuals’ basic needs, such as 
education, health care, security, and livelihood” (el-Henawy and Shawki 1). Young slum girls 
between the ages of 10 to 15 appear in media stating that “our campaign is political. We ask the 
state to protect from drug dealers and criminals that hide in our areas and to help us lead a decent 
and safe life” (el-Ebrashy). The fact that young, marginalized poor societies, particularly girls, are 
given a voice and that they dare to face the public and authorities asking for their rights as equal 
human beings show they gain a space of responsibility and action and could share a common 
democratic dream with Egyptians. They reuse the public and urban spaces not only to expose state 
hypocrisy and its pervading media-image of youth as either passive recipients or elements of chaos, 
but also to generate plural settings and meanings in opposition to oppression, socio-spatial 
segregation, emergency law, and ugliness. Tamarod is one of the most famous, nonviolent, and 
successful movements in post-2011-revolutionary Egypt that reflect the success of the civil society 
in effecting wide public change and support. Founded in 2013 by young Egyptian activists in 
opposition to Islamist President Mohamed Morsi’s temporary constitution declaration that gives 
him the unlimited power to legislate without judicial review, Tamarod gathers 22 million 
signatures, a more than enough number to call for early presidential elections. Tamarod plays a 
significant role in legalizing the ousting of President Morsi. Julia Elyachar argues that “Tamarod 
rendered visible, and upended for political goals, a social infrastructure of communicative channels 
in Egypt” and thus represent “agency as distributed, dialogic, and historically constituted” (453). 
For Elyachar, Tamarod cleverly introduces new political symbols of action by utilizing a “multi-
layered infrastructure of communicative channels with skill and tenacity such as mobile phones, 
Internet services, social media, visits, gossip, and socializing” (465). Tamarod innovatively and 
courageously mobilizes for public participation and gains international respect and support for 
their nonviolent, democratic plan of action. So, even though Tamarod’s democratic plan is not 
fully accomplished and the military re-takes power in Egypt, Tamarod’s access to public spaces 
and success in organizing and raising awareness for action promises real change in collective 
conscience in Egypt. In 2019 and 2020, and despite el-Sisi’s unprecedented oppression and police 
violence, people in slums, poor neighborhoods, and the marginalized and neglected countryside 
organize anti-el-Sisi protests. They overcome their fears and are aware of their rights (Hamad 
2020, al-Anani 2020).  
Secondly, post-2011 activism shows a green awareness of gender violence and 
marginalization as political problems rather than the traditional view that they are women’s issues. 
In Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street, Judith Butler underscores two important aspects 
of the revolutionary demonstrations in Tahrir square. The first is:  
 
“a certain sociability was established within the square, a division of labor that 
broke down gender difference that involved rotating who would speak and who 
would clean the areas, developing a work schedule for everyone to maintain the 
environment” (77).  
 
For Butler, the methodological and equal division of work, responsibility, and leadership among 
male and female protesters develops “horizontal relations” that challenge established cultural, 
political and economic hierarchies. The second aspect is:  
 
“the collective chant of the word “silmiyya” (peace, nonviolence) as a way of 
encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of military aggression – and the 
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aggression of the gangs – by keeping in mind the larger goal – radical democratic 
change” (78).  
 
Butler emphasizes that Egyptian protesters express the patience, determination, and geographical 
expansion needed to realize the revolution and not to be distracted by useless fights or violence. I 
agree with Butler that since the 2011 revolution to the present, Egyptian women are constantly 
credited and appreciated for their sacrifices, courage, and significant participation in all political 
events, elections, and socio-cultural debates. Female protesters are murdered, arrested, and 
imprisoned like their male counterparts. Moreover, Egyptian women experience systematic, 
organized, and state-sponsored acts of public sexual violence and rape as a political weapon of 
defaming and frightening female activists and their families of accessing protest spaces. Women 
in Tahrir Square and surrounding areas are constantly harassed and sometimes raped by 
unidentified mobs and by members of the security forces. In many cases, police and military 
stationed in these areas did not prevent the mob attacks (Tadros, 1351; Sorbera 69). Yet, Egyptian 
women resist and do not retreat from protest and public spaces. Rather, Egyptian women’s equal 
and acknowledged public political roles develop their green activism for establishing real gender-
ecological ethics placing sexual and gender-based violence as a health and human rights concern 
in the country. Gill Valentine argues that: 
 
The public blame of victims who were in public places, for being in a dangerous or 
inappropriate place when they were attacked, encourages all women to transfer 
their threat appraisal from men to certain public spaces. Fear of being in public 
space is for women to adopt false assumptions about their security. […] Mental 
maps of feared environments elaborated by images gained from hearing the 
frightening experiences and advice of others; and from media reporting. (386) 
 
Valentine explains how patriarchal and authoritarian societies and regimes use media to 
devilize and deform the relationship between humans in general, and women in particular, and 
environment and nature, including built and public spaces, for repressive security aims. Since the 
beginning of the 21st-century to the present time, Egyptian women experience systematic practices 
of slow public violence. The pervasive, unevenly distributed, and chaotic nature of public, 
gendered violence over space and time causes high levels of unpredictability, anxiety, and alertness 
among Egyptian women who not only internalize a culture of fear and vulnerability, particularly 
in public spaces but also that the male perpetrators and the state as unaccountable and irresponsible. 
So, women have to seclude and stay home to feel secure. Nonetheless, in post-2011 Egypt, female 
public activism and their stereotypical security perceptions change as women’s real contacts with 
different and diverse male and female agents and groups in public spaces counter traditional state 
and media narratives about public spaces as dangerous for women. For instance, during the first 
18 days of the Egyptian revolution, no single case of sexual violence is reported and female 
protesters declare that “men were not touching women; in fact, they were saying sorry every time 
they bumped into a woman” (Biggs, 1). Women’s positive experiences in revolutionary public 
spaces, Sylviane Aacinski argues, “partially destroy the old framework of political life, pushing it 
onto the stage of media communication” (130). Eventually, the emerging gender-ecological 
activism wins the media scene. Awareness campaigns of women’s rights for a secure public 
appearance and how individuals and groups ought to behave with each other and with the 
environment become consistent and common. The political-ecological causes and factors of 
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gender violence are explicitly discussed, rendering socio-cultural stereotypes that blame the female 
victims invalid. Civil male and female members of anti-sexual harassment movements and 
initiatives exist in public spaces and interfere to protect female protesters. The shortages of existing 
harassment laws are openly discussed in social media, pamphlets, online blogs and sites, TV 
programs, and public speeches by common people and public figures (Flock, 2-3 and Zakarriya, 
127). 
Providing women with safe means and platforms to tell their stories and to document the 
sexual attacks help them overcome feelings of shame and fear related to sexual violations. Such 
informal social controls and interferences in public areas gain protesters, particularly women, 
credibility and trust and endorses civil potential intervention in the decision-making processes. 
Moreover, the widespread use of public and private cameras, usually used for policing Egypt, to 
document cases of sexual violence and to catch the attackers is a new, practical approach to 
examine and watch public spaces. Egyptians are documenting, supervising, and holding 
accountable the state, its security members, and perpetrators of sexual and gendered violent acts. 
The factual, visual, and online documentation of sexual, spatial and gender violations and violence 
maintains updated information and knowledge and pressure authorities and decision-makers to act. 
For example, Presidents Morsi, and el-Sisi criminalize sexual harassment and rape, and new 
harassment laws are introduced and more women are encouraged to report their experiences of 
sexual violence. Inspired by the international #MeToo, Egyptian #metoo, and #assaultpolice, for 
example, achieve a great legal, socio-cultural, and political development through documenting and 
exposing cases of sexual violence and rape committed by upper-class, wealthy, and powerful men 
including Ahmed Bassam Zaki, AUC student and the son of a powerful and wealthy family, who 
has been coercively assaulting, harassing, and raping his female colleagues is arrested and is under 
trial. The Fairmont Hotel Group Rape was committed by a group of wealthy and powerful men 
who used to drug and rape women are caught. A poor rural girl called Farah, who is raped by two 
powerful brothers in her village, appears in the media and tells her stories. Farah’s rapists are 
caught and tried (Salah 2020; Tarek 2020). Sexual violence in Egypt is not just seen as stemming 
from cultural or social sexist ideas or problems, but as a political problem as well. Egyptian women 
realize that power and immunity beget sexual abuse. Consequently, Egyptian women’s activism 
against sexual violence is political activism. They defend their rights for equal and safe access to 
public spaces.   
 Finally, post-2011 grassroots, feminist, and opposition activism and movements are 
characterized by national and globalized green integrity and resilience against all forms of 
violence. Egyptian resistance movements adopt green thinking of security that exceeds narrow 
conceptions of war, military power, national security, terrorism, security state, and police brutality. 
Rather, they embrace a wider, ecological attitude towards security in Egypt discussing and relating 
issues of gendered and class inequalities and violence, repression, individual and collective 
security, development as entailing spatial and economic justice and access to services and 
resources, decentralized administration, and environmental degradation. Since the early beginning 
of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, there are organized visual and written documentation of individual 
and collective memory, abuses, and violation that Egyptians go through during the different stages 
of the revolution. Reputable and credible human rights, feminist and grassroots organizations, and 
movements authenticate violations and acts of violence maintaining a political space of 
condemnation and resistance of responsible and complicit regimes and structures (Sorbera, 499; 
Zakarriya, 128). The trials of Presidents Mubarak and Morsi give hope of realizing justice for past 
and present atrocities in the future. Taking into consideration the fact that the military is valued 
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and respected as the defenders of the nation, opposition movements distinguish between corrupt 
military men and the military as a protective, national entity. They use precise descriptions and 
specific, legal demands. El-Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture 
declares that “women’s security is a precondition to a real democratic transition” affirming the 
need for “legislation to penalize violence and discriminations against women, seeing that the 
Egyptian constitution lacks articles that prohibit discrimination and violence and establishing 
equality between men and women in all areas of life”. (4–5). Grassroot thinkers and feminist and 
human rights activists persuasively propagate that security in Egypt is related to “empowering 
poor and slum dwellers, particularly women, through education and skill development and 
appropriate health care to overcome high fertility and crime levels” (Naber and Abd El-Hameed, 
525). Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Arab 
Network cooperate to “document state and non-state violence against women in public spaces, 
violations against freedom of expression, violations of human and physical rights of political 
prisoners and provide legal, medical, and psychological remedies to survivors of violence” (Naber 
and Abd El-Hameed, 521-2). They communicate with and exchange knowledge with international 
human rights and feminist organizations that watch security violations in Egypt regularly.    
In Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon argues that:  
 
“violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply 
considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources but 
also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum that ‘the past is never 
dead. It’s not even past” (8).  
 
Nixon emphasizes that dictatorial and corrupt regimes permeate landscapes and oppress people 
through time exercising measures of slow violence. To refute and resist such eco-human forms of 
slow violence, Nixon continues, “resistance may assume not just human forms but also arise from 
an unanticipated recalcitrance on the part of a targeted resource, which may prove harder to 
commodify and profitably remove or manage than corporate moguls foresaw” (69). For Nixon, 
resistance requires patience, insistence, and strategy. In addition to constant documentation of 
violations and violence and awareness campaigns of human and security rights, Egyptian activists 
utilize current international and national conditions to support their green agenda. On the national 
level, el-Sisi faces the emergence of angry opposition in slums and poor areas that defy the image 
of the military men as immune to criticism. In 2019, Mohammed Ali, a young Egyptian actor and 
a wealthy construction contractor who has been working with the military for 15 years turns against 
the regime. Ali posts a series of videos on his social media giving detailed descriptions and naming 
senior military officers involved in cases of corruption and wasting billions on luxurious projects 
(Videos accusing Egypt's Sisi, 2019). Ali’s videos cause unrest and resentment among lower and 
marginalized classes who protest against their injustices who lead protests against el-Sisi asking 
for equal economic and social rights. Under extreme security measures and growing popular 
resentment concerning inequalities among classes, el-Sisi’s early call for national cohesion and 
stability is jeopardized by the exaggerated inequalities, internal displacements by environmental 
or economic stress, and human rights violations. Because of pressure from civil society and social 
criticism, the Egyptian government takes specific measures to help lower classes in slums. In 2020, 
el-Sisi declares an upgrading and national development plan of unsafe and unhealthy slums in 
Egypt (Farouk, 1).  
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On the international level, green thinking and politics get a boost with the ‘unanticipated’ 
devastating economic and health effects of the Coronavirus pandemic, the devastating everyday 
environmental-human cost of militarism, and the irresponsible use of chemicals and weapons 
symbolized in the Beirut Explosion and Trump’s defeat in 2020 Presidential elections, mainly 
because he failed to address Coronavirus appropriately. In this sense, Egypt is no exception. There 
are public demands of environmental-health sustainability. Despite the restrictions on civil 
organizations and activism, Egyptian activists and ordinary people use online platforms such as 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to exchange information and tell their experiences with 
coronavirus and public health issues. Some youth use innovative ways such as graffiti to spread 
awareness about the corona and preventive practices. Many youth-led initiatives in poor areas 
distribute free antiseptics, masks, and gloves (Zaiyada, 1). Youth not only raise awareness 
cornering measures that can be followed to prevent the transmission of the disease but also guide 
people concerning dealing with their infected neighbors and relatives. Likewise, youth in villages 
launch initiatives to sterilize the streets and houses of their villages and to educate people about 
public and private hygiene, and the right ways to deal with rubbish. A group of young people 
delivers groceries to home for free to protect the elderly. One4All is a civil society initiative to 
fight Covid-19 in Egypt. One4All is a partnership between private sector leaders and local health 
startups that is helping provide a myriad of services to Egypt’s population free of charge, to help 
the population cope and lessen the strain on hospitals (One4All, 1). Furthermore, civil groups and 
initiatives put pressure on the government to offer special help to irregular and rural workers who 
lost their jobs because of the Corona epidemic. Covid-19 exceptional measures include giving 
irregular workers, including women, a monthly allowance of EGP 500 (around USD 32) in cash, 
and increasing payments to women community leaders in rural areas from EGP 350 to EGP 900 
per month to ensure gender equity. Moreover, the Takaful and Karama social protection programs 
expand to include additional 60,000 households, where women already represent 88% of the 
programs’ beneficiaries (The Covid-19 Crisis in Egypt, 3-4). As such, the emerging resistance and 
pressure of the civil society and ordinary people in Egypt, despite strict restrictions, have great 
potential and reflect real green awareness of the interconnections between spatial, gender, and 
political violence in the society.  
   
Conclusion 
 This paper rethinks the relationship between the concepts of the security state and 
resistance in contemporary Egypt from a green perspective. It argues that civil and political 
activism in post-2011 Egypt is characterized by green trends that fight the militarization of spaces, 
economy, and power in Egypt through hybrid, collective, nonviolent actions. Although the military 
re-seizes power in 2014, the political and civil map of thought and action has changed in Egypt. 
The downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood along with the military leaders’ loss of credibility and 
immunity to criticism, propose feminist, civil, and grassroots movements as a credible and 
trustworthy substitute. Post-2011 Egyptian resistance explores military complexes, exposes the 
unjust and oppressive division of resources, services and rights in Egypt. Many political, social, 
and sexual taboos are challenged and refuted in post-2011 Egypt. Activists unite to endorse legal 
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